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II. THE NARCOTIC LOBBY AND THE
DRUG PROBLEM
ALFRED R. LINDESMITH*
For over half a century, from 1915 to the late 1960's, American
policy with respect to the currently illicit drugs was largely con-
trolled by a small decision-making elite within the federal bureauc-
racy in Washington, D.C. This elite was dominated after 1930 by
officials of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics who exercised virtually
monopolistic power over both policy and governmental propaganda
concerning the drug problem.' The policy to which this Bureau owed
its existence, and which it vigorously promoted and defended, was
one of strict prohibition that included severe penalties for all offend-
ers including the users of drugs. Through press releases, handouts
and other public relations measures, legislators, officials, enforce-
ment personnel and the general public were bombarded with the
idea that punitive policy was the only proper policy and further that
this policy was effectively dealing with the problem.2 When addic-
tion appeared to be spreading shortly after World War II, the situa-
tion was met by calling for more severe penalties, by blaming the
judiciary for its alleged leniency and by attacking constitutional
restrictions on police power. :' Only during the last several years has
there been any tendency to question the fundamental assumptions
of the punitive policy itself.
The position of this article is that twentieth century American
attempts to control or suppress bad personal habits by punitive
measures have been wrong in principle and counterproductive in
practice. Particular attention will be given to marihauna and opiate
laws, with occasional reference for comparative purposes to the na-
tional experiment with alcohol prohibition.' The practice of taking
drugs, as with alcohol, admittedly may sometimes have harmful
social effects. However, it is primarily and basically a personal prac-
tice in which the direct harm, if any, is to the user himself. The
* University Professor of Sociology, Indiana University.
1. See notes 14 to 28 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 29 to 40 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 32 to 34 infra and accompanying text.
4. Alcohol, it should be noted, is an addictive drug in the same sense as heroin, even
though it is not commonly thought of as such.
Lindesmith: II. The Narcotic Lobby and the Drug Problem
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
592 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
indirect social harm sometimes produced by illicit drugs is often the
consequence of their very illegality and, apart from that, is essen-
tially the same as that sometimes resulting from the injudicious
consumption of alcohol.
It is a common practice to explain social policy by reference to
public opinion or as an expression of the "will of society." To attrib-
ute drug policy to the will of such an abstraction is to obfuscate
rather than clarify the situation. It obscures the facts that legisla-
tures commonly act in response to pressures exerted upon them by
vested interests, that public opinion is subject to manipulation by
such interests and that central governmental bureaucracies whose
budgets, prestige and power depend upon established programs
often constitute the most powerful lobbies dedicated to the perpe-
tuation, defense or extension of such programs. This has been the
case with the narcotic problem and the narcotic laws.
THE NARCOTIC LOBBY
When the Harrison Act, a tax law directed primarily at the
opiates, went into effect in 1915, ' it was enforced initially by a
special unit within the Treasury Department On its face it was not
a prohibition measure; it made no specific mention of addicts and
did not seem to deny addicts access to legal drugs from medical
sources.7 It was thought at the time that the main effect of the Act
would be to bring the entire opiate problem into the open by making
it a matter of public record since manufacturers, distributors and
physicians who dispensed drugs were required by the measure to
keep detailed records of all transactions. The law, however, became
a prohibition measure as the result of a series of court decisions and
administrative actions and regulations during the early years of its
enforcement.8 These actions and decisions had the effect of denying
addicts access to legal drugs and of punishing them for possession
of illicit drugs when they resorted to a mushrooming black market
5. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 785 [hereinafter referred to in the text and
cited as the Harrison Act].
6. Id. at § 10.
7. See id. at § 6.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); Jin Fuey Moy v. United
States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920); Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919). For further discussion
of the restrictive interpretation given the Harrison Act, see the author's book. A. LINDESMrrH,
ADDICTION AND THE LAw 5-8 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lindesmith].
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to obtain supplies. This situation was not materially changed when
the United States Supreme Court in Linder v. United States'
adopted the "disease theory" of addiction and declared addicts to
be "diseased and proper subjects of medical care.""' While this deci-
sion seemed to mark a drastic change in the addict's legal position
with respect to physicians, enforcement practices continued as be-
fore and doctors generally ceased to have anything to do with ad-
dicts for fear of criminal prosecution."
The Harrison Act thus became a prohibition measure for rea-
sons unrelated to public opinion or legislative intentions. The Bri-
tish Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920,12 which was remarkably like the
Harrison Act in its language, did not become a prohibition measure.
The reason for the difference was that the British law was inter-
preted by medical men while the Harrison Act was, in effect, inter-
preted by enforcement authorities of the federal bureaucracy.'
In 1920 the Volstead Act went into effect. 4 Its enforcement was
combined with that of the Harrison Act, and the newly appointed
prohibition agents were put in charge of the enforcement of both
measures.'5 This situation continued until 1930 when the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics was created as a separate agency within the
Treasury Department.'6 This ten year amalgamation of the two
measures no doubt greatly contributed to establishing the punitive-
prohibition approach toward opiate users. However, when the Vol-
stead Act was repealed a few years after the creation of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, no questions were raised concerning the wis-
dom or efficacy of the antiopiate program.
The Bureau of Narcotics, headed by Commissioner Harry J.
Anslinger,' 7 quickly established itself as the prime arbiter of opinion
9. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
10. Id. at 18.
11. See Lindesmith at 11-17.
12. 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 46.
13. See, e.g., R. ASHLEY, HEROIN: THE MYTHS AND THE FACTS 150-51 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as ASHLEY]; R. KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP 33-68 (1972) [hereinafter cited as-King]; E.
SCHuR, NARCOTIC ADDICTION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 70-85 (1962).
14. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, § 1, 41 Stat. 305 [hereinafter referred to in the text
and cited as the Volstead Act].
15. Id. tit. I, § 2.
16. Act of June 14, 1930, ch. 488, § 1, 46 Stat. 585.
17. Commissioner Anslinger headed the Bureau from its inception in 1930 until his
19741
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and policy in the narcotic field. Mr. Anslinger came to be viewed
as something of a minor national hero who had saved the nation
from narcotics as J. Edgar Hoover had saved it from communism.
He was hailed by members of Congress as the greatest living author-
ity on narcotics;'I his budget was dealt with generously;'9 his views
were never challenged;2  the operations of his bureau were not inves-
tigated;2 and the statistical data that he annually presented to
Congress was accepted even when internally inconsistent and self-
contradictory.22
In 1937, largely through the efforts of Mr. Anslinger,2' Congress
enacted the Marihauna Tax Act of 193724 which was closely modeled
after the Harrison Act. Enforcement was again entrusted to Anslin-
ger's bureau.25 The number of agents in the Bureau at that time was
only about three hundred2" but this force was almost doubled in 1968
when the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was amalgamated with forces
from the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration.2 7 The amalgamated force was moved into the Depart-
retirement in 1962. Prior to 1930, Mr. Anslinger had served as Assistant Prohibition Commis-
sioner.
18. Hearings on S. 67 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in the Federal Criminal
Code of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 8 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as Daniel Hearings].
19. See note 37 infra.
20. Cf. Lindesmith at 244-45.
21. One author notes on this point that
[t]he only occasion, so far as is known, when those files [of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics] were opened to outsiders was during the 1960's, when a Boston consulting
firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc., was employed to make one study of addiction problems
for the President's Commission on Crime and another for the National Institute of
Mental Health.
E. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILcrr DRUGS 39 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Brecher]. This event
occurred after Mr. Anslinger's retirement in 1962.
22. See notes 41 to 46 infra and accompanying text.
23. Brecher at 413-18; Lindesmith at 228-37.
24. Act of Aug. 2, 1937, ch. 553, § 1, 50 Stat. 551.
25. Id. § 14.
26. At the end of 1966, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had a force of 278 agents. THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG AUSE at 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
The President's Task Force strongly recommended a material increase in the enforcement
staff of the Bureau of Narcotics and related enforcement agencies. Id. at 6-9.
27. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, 82 Stat. 1367. The Bureau of Drug Abuse Control
was established within the Food and Drug Administration to enforce the Drug Abuse Control
Amendment of 1965 which dealt with the suppression of LSD, amphetamines and other
suspected "dangerous drugs." Act of July 15, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226. Initially,
[Vol. 8
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ment of Justice and is now called the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs." The growth of this Bureau is, of course, demon-
strative of the power it has enjoyed.
THE POWER OF THE LOBBY
There is little mystery about the power exercised by what I have
called the narcotic lobby or Washington enforcement establish-
ment. The Congress contains many persons with legal training and
prosecution experience who share the police-prosecutor orientation
toward social problems. The important legislative committees of the
past that have fashioned drug policy seem invariably to have been
chaired and dominated by such persons, who also usually had long-
standing friendships with officials of the Bureau of Narcotics. Two
of these committees responsible for the 1951 and 1956 legislation
were headed by Hale Boggs of Louisiana and Price Daniel of Texas.'
The legislation was tailored almost to the last detail to conform to
the wishes of the Bureau of Narcotics.' Testimony hostile to the
proposed legislation was generally excluded from the hearings by
representatives of the Bureau and medical opinion was presented
only when it was unavoidable." While the legislation was aimed at
this Bureau had 200 agents stationed in nine field offices, with a projected estimate of 500
agents assigned by 1970. TASK FORCE REPORT at 7. President Johnson recommended the
amalgamation of the two bureaus (as well as a 30 percent increase in the number of agents)
because the fragmentation of jurisdiction, with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics having juris-
diction over narcotics and marihuana and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control having jurisdic-
tion over dangerous drugs, hindered effective enforcement of federal drug laws. In many cases,
violations of both narcotic and dangerous drug laws were present, but the arresting agent only
had jurisdiction over one offense. See Message of President Johnson to the Congress, White
House, Feb. 7, 1968.
For background on the Drug Abuse Control Amendment of 1965 and its enforcement by
the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control see generally Note, LSD: A Challenge to American Drug
Philosophy, 19 U. FIA. L. REv. 311 (1966).
28. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, § 3, 82 Stat. 1367.
29. Representative Hale Boggs served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Traffic in,
and Control of, Narcotics, Barbiturates and Amphetamines of the House Committee on Ways
and Means and was responsible for the Boggs Act of 1951, ch. 666, 65 Stat. 767 [hereinafter
cited as the Boggs Act of 1951].
Senator Price Daniel was chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in the Federal
Code of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. His efforts resulted in the Narcotics Control
Act of 1956, ch. 629, 70 Stat. 567 [hereinafter cited as the Narcotic Control Act of 1956].
30. Both the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 contained provi-
sions designed to facilitate the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in securing convic-
tions, and, in addition, the penalties for violations were enhanced. See Lindesmith at 25-28.
31. See Lindesmith at 248-51. Even where medical opinion was presented, the records
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curtailing the powers of the federal judiciary, 2 and while judges
were severely criticized by police witnesses and members of Con-
gress, :':' no federal judges testified at the hearings." They were, in
effect, tried and convicted in absentia for being lenient with "dope
peddlers." This attack on the integrity and competence of the fed-
eral judiciary by another agency of the government is a striking
example of the arrogance of bureaucratic power.
The rigid policy which this bureaucracy succeeded in imple-
menting both maintained the police monopoly of the problem and
effectively isolated the medical and scientific communities from
addicts and addiction, stifling research, experimentation and inno-
vation. The bureaucratic elite were not mere policemen and prose-
cutors; they were politicians who knew their way around Washing-
ton and cultivated day-to-day relationships with key congressional
and administrative figures. Like bureaucrats generally, they tended
to identify the interests of their agency with the public interest. The
addict, who long ago had been pronounced a proper subject of medi-
cal care, :5 found that virtually the only doors open to him were those
of the jails and prisons."6
The power exercised in the past by the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics also rested upon its propaganda campaign, generously fi-
nanced with public funds allocated to the Bureau year after year by
Congress.17 In one year the Bureau stated in its annual report that
of these hearings often suggest that these opinions were irresponsible and that the medical
profession was on trial for the improper prescription of drugs for addicts. A vivid example is
the Daniel Hearings, supra note 18, pt. 1H, at 415-30, 443-519.
32. The major impact of the laws was to take the power to mitigate punishment from
federal judges by providing for mandatory minimum sentences depending on the nature and
number of violations and by barring suspended sentences and probation. See Lindesmith 25-
28.
33. See generally Daniel Hearings, supra note 18, pt. Ill.
34. The only commentary from members of the judiciary came from state judges who
were generally critical of the discretion afforded federal judges. See, e.g., Daniel Hearings,
supra note 18, pt. II, at 430-37.
35. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
36. It should be noted that while the above remarks pertain to federal judges and the
federal policy, drug policy at the state level also has been overwhelmingly determined in
Washington. See Lindesmith at 28-34.
37. Prior to the reorganization of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1968, total appro-
priations for the necessary expenses of the Bureau for the respective years were as follows:
[Vol. 8
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it had responded to more than 66,000 requests for information." It
dipped deeply into public funds to prepare handouts representing
the narcotics problem as it wished it to be viewed and vilifying
occasional critics." These handouts were circulated gratis to those
year appropriation
T$2,990,000
1958 3,780,000
1961 4,100,000
1966 5,970,000
1968 6,565,000
Following the reorganization in April 1968 and reflecting the expanded function of the Bu-
reau, total appropriations for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs dramatically
increased as follows:
year appropriation
1969 $17,818,000 (est.)
1970 27,772,000
1971 43,592,000
1972 65,089,000
1973 71,771,000 (est.)
See THE BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov'T for the respective fiscal years. These appropriations are
further divided in the respective years for such expenses as salaries, traveling expenses,
administrative expenses and so forth. There is, of course, no specific division of the amount
of funds utilized for propaganda purposes. Thus, one can only speculate on the specific
proportion of these budgets which was used to reimburse the agent who visited my office or
the administrative costs entailed in stage managing congressional hearings.
After the reorganization in 1968, the Bureau became less secretive about their efforts to
influence popular opinion and in an explanation of budgetary expenditures indicated an
intention to increase their efforts in the area of "public education."
[Influence groups] will be reached each year through the distribution of printed
matter; debate kits; films; speeches to educational and civic groups; radio and TV
appearances; letters to over 50,000 pharmacists, and bulletins to over 27,000 law
enforcement officers and organizations.
In 1970, the number of publications will be doubled and the emphasis on use of
mass media, radio and TV will be significantly increased.
APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov'T, FISCAL YEAR 1970 at 668.
38. U.S. TREAsURy DEP'T, BUREAU OF NARcoTIcs, TRAFFic IN OPIUM AND OTHER DANGEROUS
DRUGS 38 (1966).
39. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also used the national media to manipulate public
opinion to its advantage. See BRECHER at 413-21 (use of magazine articles in the campaign
for federal marihuana laws and its effect on public opinion). The Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs has continued the propaganda campaign of its predecessor and will provide
publications and films on drug abuse upon request. U.S. Gov'T ORGANIZATION MANUAL 292,
294 (1973).
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who asked for information and, more importantly, to the press, to
members of Congress and to law enforcement officials throughout
the nation. Many of the recipients probably read little else on the
narcotic problem. Legislators, bombarded with these brochures,
were not in a position to evaluate them critically and, in any case,
were unlikely to take a stand on the issues unless it seemed that they
could win votes by doing so. Through the Bureau's massive influ-
ence, it was established that the only safe political line was to de-
mand even harsher punishment, more inflexible laws and greater
freedom of action for enforcement agencies.
In addition to the routine types of propaganda activities that
might be expected from almost any embattled agency, the Bureau
of Narcotics has sometimes resorted to more direct, "raw jaw" tac-
tics in the attempt to silence its critics. To cite a few instances from
personal experience, federal narcotic agents have visited Indiana
University at Bloomington three times on orders from Washington
on other than law enforcement business. The first time, after first
calling on the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the President
of the University, was to threaten me with the loss of my position
for advocating a medical policy toward addicts and criticizing the
Bureau's punitive policy. The second visit, by a top official of the
Bureau, was designed to pour oil on waters that had been troubled
by the first visit. The third occurred in the early 1960's, evidently
for the purpose of preventing the publication by the Indiana Univer-
sity Press of a book that I edited and for which I wrote an introduc-
tion."
The very crudeness of these tactics suggest a sense of insecurity,
vulnerability or paranoia. Predictably, a police attempt to suppress
a non-pornographic book solely because it is critical of them is
bound to fail and likely to stimulate sales. That the effort was made
indicates that, even in the early 1960's, the growing tide of criticism
of traditional narcotic policy, coupled with continued deterioration
40. The book, DRUG ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE?, was the report of a Joint Committee
of the American Medical and American Bar Associations which originally had been sponsored
by the Russell Sage Foundation which later declined to publish it. I was told that officials of
this foundation reached their decision after conversations with the head of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics who objected strongly to its criticism of the Bureau and its advocacy of a medical
approach to opiate addiction. These incidents are described in more detail in my book, THE
ADDICT AND THE LAw, 246-57 (1965).
[Vol. 8
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of the heroin problem, may have been perceived by officials of the
Washington bureaucracy as ominous portents for the future of their
empire. It was not many years later that the erosion of the power of
the Bureau of Narcotics became evident; the Bureau had been much
more successful in its public relations than in law enforcement. It
is to these recent developments that we now turn.
THE HEROIN CRISIS
When I began my studies of the opiate problem in 1935, official
estimates put the number of addicts at about 60,000.1' Government
handouts at that time were not affected by the credibility gap that
has since developed and there was little public interest in the prob-
lem. During World War II, the international illicit traffic was disor-
ganized by war conditions, heroin was in short supply and arrests
dropped.42 The Bureau of Narcotics lowered its estimate of the num-
ber of addicts to about 20,000 and when the post war increase began
to be noticed around 1950, raised it again to 60,000.11 Around this
time the Bureau manufactured its well known "ski-jump curve"
which showed a total of about 200,000 in 1914 followed by a steep
decline to 20,000 during the war years." After the war, the total rose
to 60,000 and then declined following the 1951 Boggs Act and the
41. See note 44 infra.
42. See Brecher at 94 and authorities cited therein.
43. See note 44 infra.
44. The ski-jump curve is a graphic depiction of the prepared statement of Mr. Anslin-
ger on the history of the drug problem in the United States introduced before the Daniel
Senate subcommittee in 1955. See Daniel Hearings, supra note 18, pt. I, at 9-10. The number
of addicts he claimed existed in specific years in the United States is depicted below:
THOUSAND
ADDICTS
1JUU 1 OUT IOF 4 [
200 PERSONS HARRISON ACADDIC TED,
160
140
120
1900 60,000 ADDICTS80 1936
I IN 3000
60 ADDICTED JA
20
1900) 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
1 IN 3500
DDICTED
1955 1960
LINDEsMrrH at 105.
I
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Narcotic Control Act of 1956 which sharply escalated penalties."5
The entire curve was a fiction that bore no relationship whatever to
any known statistics, but it was presented annually at the Congres-
sional hearings on the Bureau's budget and accepted as authorita-
tive.4"
The figure of 50,000 or 60,000 addicts in the nation is described
as an irreducible minimum even though it is larger than the total
for all the Countries of Europe combined and is known to be an
underestimate. 7 Press releases and handouts nonetheless assured
the public and legislators that the problem was under control, that
the apparent deterioration after the war was being grossly exagger-
ated and that all problems could be quickly resolved by increasing
penalties and curbing judicial powers."' When arrest rates increased,
this was interpreted as evidence that the problem was being vigor-
ously dealt with; when rates declined, this was taken to mean that
the problem was diminishing.
During the last ten to fifteen years, the official Washington
position has been discredited by developments that could no longer
be concealed by optimistic handouts or statistical fakery. The offi-
cial estimate of the number of addicts has gone up about 1000 per-
45. See note 44 supra.
46. The ski-jump curve on its face is highly improbable. It suggests, for example, that
in a 30-year span over 180,000 addicts simply vanished. There are, of course, no official
statistics which reliably reflect the actual number of addicts in this country except as they
are arrested, and these figures only superficially indicate the magnitude of the problem.
Nonetheless, there is no correspondence between Mr. Anslinger's estimates and the number
of arrests reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For example, between 1951 and
1956 Mr. Anslinger reports a sharp decline in the number of addicts while the arrest figures
of the F.B.I. almost doubled and continued to rise. For a critical evaluation of the ski-jump
curve, see Lindesmith at 104-24. Despite the obvious inaccuracy of the estimates by Mr.
Anslinger, he clung to his ski-jump curve until his retirement and presented it to the Ameri-
can people and Congress as an accurate depiction of the success of his Bureau. See, e.g.,
Anslinger, We're Winning the War Against Dope!, THIS WEEK MAGAZINE, April 16, 1961, at
11.
For an update of the numbers game, see ASHLEY at 38-48.
47. See Vogel, Isbell & Chapman, Present Status of Narcotic Addiction, 138 J.A.M.A.
1019-26 (1948). These officials of the Public Health Service placed the total number of addicts
at 48,000, a figure that was often used interchangeably with 50,000 to 60,000 as an irreducible
minimum in the media. For comparative figures for the combined number of addicts in
European countries during this period, see Lindesmith at 179-80 (U.N. Summaries placed the,
estimated number of addicts in Europe at approximately 8,000).
48. See, e.g., Anslinger, We're Winning the War Against Dope!, THIS WEEK MAGAZINE,
April 16, 1961, at 11; N.Y. Times, June 3, 1955, at 11, col. 1.
[Vol. 8
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cent to nearly 600,000;" the estimated total in New York City alone
has jumped from around 20,000 to over 100,000;10 and the crimes
committed by addicts to raise money for black market heroin un-
doubtedly have become a major factor in increasing the urban citi-
zen's fear of being victimized, both in the streets and in his home. 5'
A recent study of a number of heroin addicts concluded that, with
drug offenses excluded, addicts committed an average of 23 crimes
a month, seven percent of them being robberies or muggings.2 As-
suming 100,000 addicts in New York City, this would mean
2,300,000 crimes per month or 27,600,000 annually. Even if these
figures are exaggerated by as much as 100 percent, they still suggest
that the drug problem alone probably accounts for much of the
impression that American cities are among the most dangerous in
the world. Moreover, heroin addiction, which once seemed to be
reasonably well confined to the slums and Black ghettos, 3 has
spilled out of the slums into the suburbs and onto the campuses;54
49. Myles J. Ambrose, then head of the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement,
estimated on April 3, 1972, that there were 560,000 addicts in the nation. Ashley at 43.
Ashley's own estimate is 720,000 untreated addicts in the United States. Id. at 48.
50. Ashley cites this figure as the most conservative estimate available, noting that a
BNDD statistician, Dr. Joseph Greenwood, estimated in 1968 that there were 150,000 addicts
in New York City. Id. at 41, 46. Ashley calls attention to a New York City register of known
addicts that contains 150,000 names and himself estimates New York's addicts at more than
300,000. Id. at 47.
51. A poll of 43,000 readers conducted by LIFE magazine concluded that over 80 percent
of those in cities over 500,000 felt unsafe on the streets at night; in cities of 1,000,000 or more,
three out of five claimed that they or members of their family had been victims of crime
during the last year; 30 percent of the respondents stated that they kept guns in their homes
for protection; and 78 percent said they sometimes felt unsafe in their own homes. LIFE, Jan.
14, 1972, at 28.
52. Inciardi & Chambers, Unreported Criminal Involvement of Narcotic Addicts, 2 J.
DRUG ISSUES 57, 64 (1972).
53. BNDD statisticians claimed in 1970 that 48.4 percent of known addicts were Black.
BRECHER at 18. This high addiction rate, however, seems to be a post-W.W. U development.
Id. at 18-19. See also C. THOMAS, THE EPIDEMIOLOGY oF OPIATE ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES
89-90 (1970) (noting that in 1937, 88.4 percent of the male patients admitted to Lexington
Hospital were white, 8.9 percent Negro, 1.2 percent Mexican and 1.5 percent other; in 1962,
51 percent were white, 30 percent Negro, 12.2 percent Puerto Rican, 4.9 percent Mexican and
1.5 percent other).
54. While heroin use is undoubtedly increasing among young people in suburbs and on
campuses, the extent of the problem is difficult to assess. In 1971 it was estimated that 12
percent of the national high school population had tried heroin. B. JOHNSON, MARIHUANA
USERS AND DRUG SUBCULTURE 93 (1973). In the New York area it was estimated that of persons
graduating from high schools, 0.5 percent had used heroin in 1966, while in 1970 the figure
rose to nine percent. Id. at 219. In a sample of about 3,500 New York college students, 126
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the American drug scene has become a spawning ground for esoteric
drug cults. This new fertile ground has also, more than ever before,
become a prime target for heroin dealers and manufacturers
throughout the world.55
The bankruptcy of the exclusively punitive approach to the
heroin problem, like that of the prohibition of alcohol in the 1920's,
is especially evident in the big cities. Turning again to New York
City, if it is proposed to incarcerate any significant proportion of the
city's addicts and peddlers under the old guidelines of "getting ad-
dicts off the streets" and "cracking down" on pushers, the penal
establishment of the State of New York could not begin to accom-
modate them. ', The recent proposal of Governor Rockefeller 7 to
impose mandatory life sentences on peddlers and addicts who com-
mit crimes under the influence of drugs and to eliminate plea bar-
gaining and parole at the same time, represents a regression, a long
step backward, and has been so received by most knowledgeable
observers. 8 The fact that this proposal has been made at this stage
in the evolution of drug policy is an indirect tribute to the effective-
ness of decades of governmental propaganda advocating punish-
ment as the only remedy for the drug problem. In the meantime,
New York City has the melancholy distinction of being the only
metropolitan area in the world which can claim the heroin habit as
the number one cause of deaths of persons between the ages of
fifteen and thirty-five.-
had used heroin and about 35 (or one percent) were addicts. Id. at 116. Even if these figures
are imprecise, they are at least indications of the expanding dimensions of the problem and
the need for reevaluating our national drug policy. See generally Brecher at 183-92.
55. The amount of heroin being brought illegally into the United States is highly specu-
lative. It depends on a variety of factors, such as how many addicts there actually are, how
much heroin they use per day and the dilution factor of the final street product. For some
comparative figures, see Ashley at 16-23 (his own estimate is at least 22 tons per year). See
also Brecher at 92.
56. See Fourth National Conference on Methadone Treatment: Proceedings, San
Francisco, Jan. 8-10, at 69 (published by the National Association for the Prevention of
Addiction to Narcotics, New York, 1972).
57. See Annual Message of Governor Rockefeller to the New York Legislature, Jan. 3,
1973 in [1973] Session Laws of New York at 2309, 2317-20. The New York Legislature
considerably modified Governor Rockefeller's proposal. See, e.g., Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 276,
[1973] Session Laws of New York 371.
58. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1973, at 1, col. 5 (Mayor John Lindsay of New York City);
N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 3 (New York State Commissioner on Drugs).
59. Brecher at 102.
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Another facet of the heroin situation tarnishing the public
image of the enforcement bureaucracy has been the exposure of
widespread corruption in narcotic enforcement on the part of both
federal and local agents in New York City. Several years ago an
investigation initiated in Washington, D.C., was followed by the
resignations of about 50 federal narcotic agents who were or had
been stationed in the New York office which had approximately 80
agents attached to it while the entire national force numbered only
300. Later still, the Knapp Commission inquiry indicated considera-
ble graft within the huge New York narcotic squad, and very re-
cently the disappearance of large quantities of seized heroin from
the police vaults confirmed this impression.'" Scandals of this di-
mension, which seem to be a recent occurrence, suggest that the
heroin crisis has generated a growing disillusionment within the
enforcement ranks.
THE METHADONE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
The methadone maintenance program, which originated in
New York City in 1964,1 was a response to a crisis. City officials had
gradually come to the painful realization that the heroin situation
was bad and getting worse; traditional methods of suppression no
longer made sense. It became increasingly clear that the punitive
approach only pushed the problem underground. Through the influ-
ence of a black market that enriched nonaddicted criminal entre-
preneurs who were rarely arrested, the problem slipped more or less
out of sight and out of control. There was a desperate search for
alternative ways of dealing with the problem, and increasing atten-
tion was given to medically oriented programs in European coun-
tries whose drug problems were miniscule compared to that of the
United States or even that of New York City alone.2
The methadone program, which consists of simply providing
addicts with a legal, low cost, opiate-type synthetic drug that main-
tains their addiction, is an improved variant of the kind of program
60. Ashley at 136-39 cites numerous articles from the New York Times on these scan-
dals which were extensively covered by the press late in 1971. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
1973, at 1, col. 4 (Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy stated 398 lbs. of heroin and
cocaine were stolen from police vaults).
61. For background on the first methadone program, see generally N. HENTOFF, A Doc-
TOR AMONG THE ADDicnrs (1969).
62. See note 47 supra.
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that exists in most European countries."3 It is also the kind of pro-
gram which was bitterly and virtually unanimously opposed by
Washington officials over a period of decades. This opposition was
not confined to the enforcement bureaucracy alone but also was
expressed by Public Health Service officials. In 1948, for example,
Dr. Victor H. Vogel, formerly of the Lexington Hospital for addicts,
criticized my proposal "4 that such a program was needed saying that
it was "naive in the extreme and dangerous to the public health of
the nation."' 5 The methadone program itself was begun in New York
against the advice of Washington narcotics officials and in the face
of the possibility of criminal prosecution. When it began to show
signs of success, hostility from enforcement sources increased even
more and various efforts to sabotage it were made.6"
Despite these hostile efforts, the methadone maintenance pro-
gram has been spreading rapidly throughout the United States and
in a number of foreign countries as well. It was recently estimated
that about 80,000 addicts are currently being provided with metha-
done at several hundred centers scattered throughout the country. 7
A recently reported decline in rates of property offenses in a number
of cities may well account for the program's widespread accept-
ance.6
It is not appropriate or relevant here to discuss this program in
detail or to consider its weaknesses and the criticisms that are made
of it. My present concern is to indicate only that it is medically
directed and that it has had the effect of breaking the enforcement
monopoly that has for so long dominated the scene. The medical
and scientific communities are again in touch with the addict and
the addiction problem; the field is alive with new ideas, new experi-
mentation and a new spirit. Narcotic conferences which used to be
dominated by prosecutors and police officials are now more often
dominated by medical men and scientists. Within the Washington
63. For a description of the British program, see LINDESMITH at 162-88. See also Ashley
at 149-68; Brecher at 120-29.
64. See A. LINDESMrrH, OPtATE ADDICTION 204-10 (1947).
65. 38 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 885 (1948).
66. Cf. King at 256-60, 333-37.
67. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, at 48, col. 1. See also Fifth National Conference on
Methadone Treatment: Proceedings, New York, March 17-19, 1973, at 1416 (published by the
National Association for the Prevention of Addiction to Narcotics, New York, 1973).
68. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1973, at 49, col. 1.
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bureaucracy, the enforcement lobby now is compelled to compete
with other agencies representing medical and health interests. Gov-
ernment money now is being used to subsidize methadone pro-
grams, " and the President's advisor on the drug problem, Dr. Jer-
ome Jaffe, 71 a leader in the methadone movement, quite capably
represents the medical and therapeutic orientation. Nevertheless,
as Governor Rockefeller has demonstrated, the old line punitive
program is not dead. The current government program, indeed, is
ambivalent. On the one hand, it has permitted and even encouraged
the spread of the methadone and other therapeutically designed
programs; on the other hand, it continues to provide severe punish-
ment for those addicts which the program fails to reach largely
because of its own inadequacy. 7' In effect, the current approach
punishes the addict for not utilizing treatment facilities which are
not made available to him.
In the meantime, within the bureaucracy a power struggle is
apparently developing between the enforcement agencies threat-
ened with the loss of an empire and newly emerged health and
medical interests. There are some signs of an attempt to strangle the
methadone program with red tape and over-regulation." Undoubt-
edly, the most powerful enemies of the methadone and other medi-
cal programs for addicts are to be found in the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. If this Bureau is permitted to have its way,
it is possible that the errors of the past with respect to heroin will
be repeated with methadone. It is hard to escape the conclusion that
much of what is happening in the bureaucracy is motivated more
by self-interest than by consideration of the national welfare.
69. The budget proposed for 1974 by President Nixon allocated 719 million dollars for
all drug programs compared to 654 million dollars for 1973. Of the 719 million, 274 million
was specified for treatment and rehabilitation, and 243 million of this amount was directed
to the National Institute of Mental Health which is particularly involved in funding metha-
done programs. See DRUGS AND SOCIETY, Mar. 1973, Vol. 2, at 21-22.
70. In 1971 Dr. Jaffe was appointed director of the Nixon Administration's Special
Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention in Washington, D.C. From 1965-71, Dr. Jaffe served
as director of the Illinois Narcotic Advisory Council and was instrumental in establishing
effective methadone maintenance and auxiliary drug programs in that state and on the
national level. In 1973 Jaffe was replaced by Dr. R.L. DuPont who had been in charge of the
Washington, D.C. methadone clinic.
71. Cf. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801 et seq. (1970).
72. See King at 256-60, 333-37; SCINCE, Aug. 11, 1972, Vol. 177, at 502-04 (F.D.A.
guidelines tighten distribution of methadone).
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THE MARIHUANA FIASCO
Like the antiheroin program, marihuana enforcement is also in
a rather obvious state of dilapidation and decay. The federal ban
on marihuana was enacted in 193711 at the behest of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics on the grounds that this substance produced
insanity, murder, mayhem, slaughter on the highways and other
violent crime." Even then, however, it was known that alcohol pro-
duces all these effects much more commonly than "pot." Moreover,
in the hearings prior to the enactment of the legislation, Mr. Anslin-
ger was twice asked about the tendency to progress from marihuana
to heroin and twice denied that this occurred, saying that heroin
and marihuana users constituted two separate, unrelated groups."
In the 1950's, when penalties for offenses involving heroin were
being escalated, penalties for marihuana violations were also in-
creased in a seemingly casual manner. At this time Mr. Anslinger
reversed his earlier position, arguing that marihuana should be pro-
hibited, not because it generated crime, but because it led to the use
of heroin.7 1
For close to three decades after the 1937 legislation, those who
were sent to jail or prison for marihuana violations were mainly
children of the poor from the slums and Black ghettos.7 7 There was,
during this period, little public interest in marihuana and almost
no public criticism of the injustice and cruelty of the savage penal-
ties embodied in the laws. At the White House Conference of 1962,
for example, the focus was on heroin, and marihuana was scarcely
73. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, § 1, 50 Stat. 551.
74. See Brecher at 413-21.
75. Mr. Anslinger testified at both the House and Senate Hearings on the taxation of
marihuana to this effect. See Hearings on H.R. 6906 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 75 Cong., 1st Seas., at 24 (1937) and Hearings on H.R. 6906 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14-15 (1937).
76. Daniel Hearings, supra note 18, pt. 5, at 16.
77. There were very few studies of marihuana until the 1960's in this respect. But see
MAYOR LAGuARDIA'S COMMITrEE ON MARIHUANA, THE MARIHUANA PROBLEM IN THE CrrY OF NEW
YORK (1945) in THE MARIHUANA PAPERS 251 (D. SOLOMON ed. 1966) where the committee noted
that of 167 persons arrested for marihuana violations in New York City from October 1939 to
November 1940, 89 were Negro, 37 white, 28 Latin-American, 10 colored Latin-American, one
British East Indian, one Filipino and one Chinese. The committee concluded that "[tihe
distribution and use of marihuana is centered in Harlem. The majority of marihuana smokers
are Negroes and Latin-Americans." Id. at 259. By 1967 the President's Task Force on Narcot-
ics and Drug Abuse reported that marihuana use was apparently increasing both within
depressed urban areas and the college communities. TASK FORCE REPORT at 3.
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mentioned. 8 Federal enforcement activities reflected this lack of
interest and in 1960 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics reported only
169 cases involving marihuana. 9 At the same time, however, it was
not maintained that the use of "pot" was diminishing.
All of this changed a few years later when marihuana, like
heroin, moved out of the slums into the middle and upper classes
and onto the college campuses. Some estimates currently place the
number of those who use or have tried this substance at twenty
million or more,"' with the practice spreading not only among adults
but also into high schools and even grade schools. It appears that
even a moderately vigorous enforcement campaign could, by itself,
fill all the jails and prisons of the nation with marihuana offenders
alone and keep most of the police and the courts busy with this one
problem.
When the sons and daughters of well-to-do, respectable and
influential families began to be arrested, a new attitude toward
marihuana quickly developed both within a segment of the general
public and within the legal profession. Defendants were now more
often represented by competent, well-paid attorneys who had no
difficulty in finding arguments attacking the laws. Just as the Vol-
stead Act had sparked a bitterly divisive debate between the "wets"
and the "drys," the marihuana laws generated a similar confronta-
tion between the generations. A storm of criticism was directed at
the drug laws in general and the marihuana laws in particular;'
associations of various kinds were organized to promote reform or
to legalize or decriminalize the use of pot.8" As the great marihuana
78. See generally PROCEEDINGS, WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON NARCOTIC AND DRUG
ABUSE, Washington, D.C., Sept. 27-28, 1962.
79. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BUREAU OF NARCOTCS, TRAFFIC IN OPIUM AND OTHER DANGER-
OUS DRUGS 71 (1960).
80. FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARI-
HUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 7 (1972) (estimate of 24,000,000 on the basis of a
national survey sponsored by the commission).
81. Practically all the authors of books on marihuana are critical of the marihuana laws.
See THE MARIJUANA REVIEW, Sept. 1973, Vol. 1, at 47-48 for an impressive list of endorsers
supporting the decriminalization of marihuana.
82. The most powerful and prestigious association is probably the National Organiza-
tion for the Reform of Marihuana Laws (NORML) which maintains a Washington lobby and
is currently filing suit to have punishment for possession declared unconstitutional. Ander-
son, The Pot Lobby, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 8.
For additional organizations supporting the decriminalization of marihuana, see THE
MARIJUANA REVIEW, Sept. 1973, Vol. 1, at 48.
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debate progressed, its emotionalism increased, public support of the
laws diminished, the laws were enforced less vigorously or evaded
altogether and the logic of argument degenerated.
Advocates of reform compared the use of pot with that of alco-
hol and accused whiskey-drinking officials and legislators of hypoc-
risy, arguing that marihuana was less harmful than alcohol." The
Establishment, embarrassed and hard-pressed, answered that alco-
hol had become part of the culture and that the harmful effects of
marihuana had not yet been sufficiently examined by scientists.
When the latter turned their attention to this matter in recent years,
their findings were inconclusive and consisted, in the main, of redis-
covering what was already known, leaving the essentials of the situ-
ation unchanged. Confidence in the essential fairness of the entire
system of criminal justice declined, especially among the young,
and hostility toward the narcotics police became intense. This hos-
tility continues to be fueled by reports, such as the recent ones from
Texas of two marihuana offenders who were given sentences of ten
and of fifty years in prison, and of 700 persons, more than half of
them first offenders, serving sentences averaging over nine years for
simple possession. 4
An excellent illustration of the degeneration of the logic of the
argument in favor of the marihuana laws is provided by the "step-
ping stone" theory which holds that "pot" smokers should be pun-
ished because most heroin smokers used marihuana before heroin.
What is disregarded is that most marihuana smokers do not prog-
ress to heroin; that most heroin and marihuana users previously
smoked tobacco and drank alcohol; and that the very illegality of
marihuana tends to push its users, and especially those who deal in
it, into association with heroin users and distributors. 5 There are
other progressions which are totally disregarded, such as a widely
observed tendency for some heavy consumers of alcohol to progress
directly to heroin or opiate use."6 There is also a progression from
83. See, e.g., J. FORT, THE PLEASURE SEEKERS (1969).
84. THE LEAFLET, March, 1973, Vol. 2, at 2.
85. See B. JOHNSON, MARIHUANA USERS AND DRUG SUBCULTURES 90-121 (1973). See also
Brecher at 427-29; J. O'DONNELL, NARCOTIC ADDICTS IN KENTUCKY 135-42 (1969).
86. For example, of a sample of 1,100 addicts studied at Lexington about 75 percent
had never tried marihuana whereas 95 percent of the sample had previously used alcohol to
excess. Louisville Courier-Journal and Times, June 20, 1971, § B, at 10.
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the use of legally prescribed drugs to illicit ones and it is known that
parents who drink or who use tranquillizers and sedatives are more
likely to have children who use illicit drugs than those who do not."
If one takes into consideration both the illicit and the licit drugs
such as nicotine and alcohol, the stepping stone justification for
punishing marihuana smokers becomes obviously untenable. The
fact that the argument is taken seriously is merely an indication of
an extreme shortage of logical arguments.
It has come to be widely recognized that the greatest evil that
the use of marihuana produces is the danger of arrest and criminal
prosecution: the harmful personal and social effects of criminal
prosecution far outweigh the effects of any drug, be it marihuana,
alcohol or heroin. Despite the tragedy that enforcement may pro-
duce, the marihuana laws and the use of marihuana have become
favorite subjects of jokes and laughter, perhaps the best indication
of a disrespect for the law. While the kinds of crime that rightfully
deserve thorough police investigation, such as mugging, homicide,
robbery, rape and burglary have risen steadily, too much police
effort is devoted to trivialities such as searching for marihuana seeds
on the floors of automobiles or recovering miniscule shreds of mari-
huana from people's pockets. The enforcement tactics used com-
monly involve the use of decoys, informers and the wholesale inva-
sion of privacy."' As the laws are increasingly evaded and unen-
forced, they tend to be used increasingly in a discriminatory manner
to harass people who are disliked for reasons having nothing to do
with drug abuse, such as unconventional dress, long hair or unpop-
ular political views and activities.
With the trend toward the decriminalization of marihuana use,
as indicated by the reduction of first-possession offenses to the mis-
demeanor level in most states,"9 another segment of the narcotic
bureaucracy's empire seems to be slipping away. Outside of the field
of criminal law enforcement, most agencies with records as bad as
that of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and its successor, the Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, for over half a century,
would long since have been reorganized, dismantled or had their
policies overhauled. It is primarily in the enforcement field that the
87. See R. BLUM, STUDENTS AND DRUGS II 84-109, 139 (1970).
88. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
89. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-7 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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remedy for disasters produed by past policies is thought to be more
of the same patent medicine that has proven itself worse than the
disease.
ON THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED
This article began with a statement that the drug laws were
wrong in principle as well as counterproductive in practice. As a
final point, I should like to illustrate this issue of principle. The
principle involved here was succinctly stated many years ago by
John Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forebear because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would
be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remon-
strating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading
him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visit-
ing him with any evil in case he does otherwise. To justify
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must
be calculated to produce evil to someone else.'
This principle is an integral part of our legal system and of most
other civilized countries. It deals with considerations of justice, fair
play and the rights of the individual. Official discussions of the drug
problem, however, almost never mention these words. The emphasis
in framing drug laws is on deterrence, inflexibility and punishment.
It is considered of first importance that the laws be cruel and of no
importance that they be just or humane.
Our departure from the principle stated by Mill began, in re-
spect to the drug policy, in 1914 with the Harrison Act and its
subsequent interpretation as a prohibition measure" and has con-
tinued to the present. Society, in the meantime, has paid a heavy
price for this abandonment of justice in favor of retribution as the
history of the heroin and marihuana situations amply demonstrate.
The current situation has its roots in the past, where it was quietly
developing in the slums and Black ghettos while we were being
90. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9-10 (A. Castell ed. 1947).
91. See note 8 supra.
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss3/3
NARCOTIC LOBBY
regaled with stories of the heroic exploits of narcotic agents and
reassured by optimistic government handouts.
The heroin and marihuana problems have, of course, deterio-
rated in quite different ways and for different reasons, although
both stem from the same basic source, i.e., an emotional, overhasty
resort to coercion in dealing with what are essentially public health
rather than police problems. The opiate prohibition, unlike the Vol-
stead Act or the antimarihuana laws today, applied only to a small,
nonvocal minority reduced to virtual outlaw status and seemingly
confined to urban slums. Because the majority of citizens had no
direct experience with the problem, the enforcement bureaucracy
easily concealed the subject.
The marihuana problem was very different, especially when
"pot" smoking was taken up by middle and upper class youth dur-
ing the 1960's. Unlike heroin users, the smokers of marihuana were
not pressured into criminal enterprises in order to finance their
habit and were arrested mainly for their violations of the drug laws,
as first offenders in most cases.92 They were also much more numer-
ous than heroin users and, unlike the latter, were far from being a
hopeless, helpless and inarticulate group. Supported by competent
and expensive legal talent, as well as by influential segments of the
respectable public, they confronted the defenders of the status quo
with an array of embarrassing arguments and with the beginnings
of organized opposition that includes lobbying activities.
The force of Mill's ideas can be best illustrated by the mari-
huana situation. In comparison with the rough treatment accorded
marihuana users, dealers and growers, the "pushers" of cigarettes
and alcohol are often respected, influential and wealthy citizens
represented by giant corporations and powerful lobbies, sometimes
even enjoying governmental subsidies. 3 Instead of resorting to coer-
92. The Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, upon examining the arrest records
of marihuana offenders in New York and Philadelphia, found that less than 10 percent of
those arrested in Philadelphia were "known to the police" and in New York only 20 percent
had arrest records, commonly for traffic and other minor offenses. The Commission concluded
that crime rates among marihuana users (apart from marihuana offenses) were about the
same as those in the general population. FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 71-77 (1972).
93. In 1969 the Department of Agriculture was spending 1.8 million dollars to support
the price of tobacco; 28 million dollars to subsidize tobacco exports; 240 thousand dollars to
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cive measures to counteract the propaganda and advertising of the
tobacco and alcohol industries that urge consumption of their prod-
ucts, the gentler arts of education and persuasion are employed to
combat the known bad effects of tlF-se two substances.94 Whether
one chooses to drink or to smoke is viewed as a personal matter and
outside the legitimate business of government. Under these circum-
stances, it is easy to understand why marihuana users and dealers
do not regard themselves as criminals and why they are joined by
substantial segments of informed opinion in regarding criminal
prosecution as a much greater evil than the use of the drug.
If the laws designed to protect the young from the evils of drugs
actually accomplished this purpose and genuinely represented gov-
ernment with the consent of the governed, they might be supported
by the young. However, there is considerable reason to think that
marihuana is less harmful or dangerous to the user and to society
than alcohol.95 It is also known that many legislators, policemen,
prosecutors and various other officials drink alcoholic beverages and
would strenuously resist, on the grounds of civil liberty, any attempt
on the part of the government to interfere with their right to do so.
There is thus a manifest and gross incongruity involved when
whiskey-drinking officials solemnly consider the appropriate length
of prison terms that should be imposed on those who prefer mari-
huana to alcohol. The drinkers of alcohol are secure in their personal
freedom to drink and are not threatened by the tyranny of the
majority simply because they are the majority. Marihuana users
should not be subjected to this tyranny simply because they are the
minority.
It has been said that societies have the criminals they deserve
and one might argue that they also have the drug problems they
deserve. In retrospect it seems clear that if our drug policy had
originally taken a line based on principles of justice, humanity and
individual liberty, rather than on retribution, coercion, cruelty and
promote cigarette sales abroad; and 30 million dollars a year to ship tobacco abroad to
developing countries through the "Food for Peace" program. Drew, The Cigarette Companies
Would Rather Fight than Switch, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 36-37, 129-
33.
94. For example, set the recent anti-smoking campaign on television and the required
warning on cigarette packs.
95. See Brecher at 260-66, 249-53, 431-33 for examples of reports comparing the use of
alcohol with the use of marihuana.
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deterrence, it would also have been more effective. It would, in that
case, not have criminalized the users but rather turned them over
to the medical profession, effectively substituting the techniques of
training, education, medication and persuasion for those of coer-
cion.
CONCLUSION
In view of the role that the federal enforcement bureaucracy has
played in stifling criticisms, blocking innovation and reform, in mis-
representing the facts and in keeping the nation on the course that
has produced the present crisis, an obvious, logical suggestion is
that this bureaucracy in its present form be dismantled much as the
alcohol bureaucracy was after the repeal of the eighteenth amend-
ment. Rufus King has already proposed that this be done." Two
public administration professionals, assessing the problems of li-
quor control in 1936 shortly after repeal, offered the following con-
sidered opinion which is also applicable here:
Indeed, considering the ineptitude of Congress in dealing
with the subject, we are disposed to say that the less the
federal government has to do with matters relating to the
social control of liquor the better. It is too far removed from
the more important problems that arise in connection with
the consumption of alcoholic beverages. 7
If the present burgeoning federal narcotics enforcement bu-
reaucracy were to be dismantled, this would put the police power
and responsibility for drug policy in the hands of the states, leaving,
as in the case of alcohol, some appropriate residual functions with
the federal government. The latter's role with respect to the con-
sumption of drugs would be to provide advice, leadership, funds and
information, leaving the states free to adapt their policies to their
own particular problems. In this decentralized situation, the federal
health, welfare, medical and research agencies would probably per-
form more significant advisory and educational functions than they
96. King at 348-50, 355-58.
97. L. HARRISON & E. LAINE, AftER REPEAL 41 (1936) (original emphasis). Another
relevant instance is the recommendation of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
an unbiased citizen's organization concerned with prison reform, that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons should be dismantled.
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now do, encouraging the states to handle drug consumption more
as a public health problem than as a police problem. Perhaps one
of the most important effects of such a change might be that of
removing the drug issue from the national political arena, thus pre-
venting its exploitation as a political issue and saving the public
from the misinformation of aspiring politicians. Further, much du-
plication of effort and cross purposes that now prevail would be eli-
minated. Vested interest lobbies, of course, would continue at the
state level, but such lobbies would be much less well-financed and
much more visible and responsive than those in Washington. With
the removal of some of the inflexibility and unresponsiveness gener-
ated by bureaucratic empire building in Washington, discussion of
drug policy might become more rational and policy itself more var-
ied, responsible and progressive.
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